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Social Media in conflict
Comparing Military and  
Social- Movement Technocultures
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Abstract There are important differences in how information 
technology is used in military and social- movement cultures. Militaries 
use social media in the Human Terrain model and security- police mode 
for quantifying and controlling social space, in order to meet low- 
intensity, counterinsurgency, and regime- maintenance goals (or for 
recruitment and public relations). For social- movement cultures, such 
as secular Egyptian revolutionaries, 15M (Los Indignados), and Idle 
No More, social media is an integral part of life; it is context. Unlike 
these horizontalist movements, military institutions are based on a 
hierarchical structure that precludes social media from becoming part 
of their organizational and decision- making culture. For them, social 
media constitute part of civil society, a commons both virtual and 
physical. The synergy between computer networks and decentralized 
social movements is clear when military, social- movement, and 
network theories and practices are compared. These differences are 
manifested in asymmetrical relationships to “veillance,” alternative 
modes of producing social technologies (especially protocols), 
contrasting theories of power, and opposing conceptions of morality 
and efficacy. The differences are more than a matter of how the 
affordances of information technologies match with the different 
technocultures. Horizontalist social movements incorporate new 
information technologies into their praxis as self- control, while 
militaries seek to subsume them into the existing hierarchical control 
paradigms.
Keywords information war; information technologies; affordances; 
protocols; control
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Context: Proliferating Hybrids
Protocol is a solution to the problem of hierarchy.  
It is in many ways an historical advancement.
 — Alexander Galloway, Protocol
The April 2013 bombing of the Boston 
Marathon revealed a great deal about 
social change and social media. The 
bombers seem to have recruited them-
selves through the interweb.1 After their 
heinous act, they were identified through 
crowdsourced analysis of raw big data col-
lected and processed by the US security 
bureaucracies. Boston was locked down 
as militarized police squads and armored 
cars searched for one wounded nineteen- 
year- old. Once found, he was observed 
by infrared from a helicopter and then a 
remote- controlled “robot” pulled back the 
tarp covering him.
This effective hybrid mobilization of 
hierarchical and distributed networks was 
mediated through mass and social media. 
In some ways, the process was what US 
military planners hoped the Human Terrain 
program and other information- based inter-
ventions would produce in Afghanistan and 
Iraq but never did. The US military doesn’t 
have either the culture or the systems 
architecture necessary for these kinds of 
successes. For military cultures, heir to 
thousands of years of orders- from- the- top 
hierarchies, framed by patriarchal values 
and a focus on instrumentalist violence, par-
ticipatory social change is impossible. Still, 
the US military and its allies have deepened 
their commitment to C4I2 (Command, Con-
trol, Communications, Computers, Intelli-
gence, and Interoperability). This infocentric 
view of war is an integral quality of the cur-
rent postmodern war system (Gray 1997). 
But there are many ways to put information 
at the center of one’s worldview.
For armies, information is the power 
to accomplish specific missions: killing, 
wounding, capturing, degrading enemy 
systems, defending, supplying, and so on. 
A distributed network of semiautonomous 
interlinked nodes deploys information to 
enrich itself with connections, processes, 
possibilities. The flows between the nodes 
are flexible, and the information they 
deploy sustains but also reconfigures the 
network, making it flexible as well.
To understand these new dynamics 
between organizations, technologies, and 
politics is to accept the information revo-
lution: “The relationship between humans 
and information has changed profoundly 
during the late 20th century; increased 
accessibility and an explosion in the quan-
tity and quality of information made avail-
able to individuals requires new strategies 
and models to cope with these changes, 
which threaten to sweep away notions of 
identity and choice” (Macauley and Gordo- 
López 1995: 436). This crisis of meaning 
isn’t going away; rather, it is deepening. The 
institutionalization of innovation established 
within the military (Van Creveld 1989) is 
also occurring within civilian technoscience. 
The perpetual revolution in military affairs 
that defines postmodern war is matched by 
a permanent revolution in information tech-
nology, producing, among other things, an 
ongoing revolution in revolutionary political 
change (Gray 2005).
Officially, the significant militaries 
of the world have embraced this new 
information system paradigm. All levels 
of war are pursued through an informatics 
lens, be it the artificial intelligence of an 
Aegis system on a warship or the quan-
tified anthropology of the Human Terrain 
program to, among other tasks, acquire 
targeting intelligence for human – machine 
killer- drone teams. But, in practice, these 
“updated” militaries have not been able 
to renounce “force of fire” as the most 
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important force multiplier and accept that, 
in contemporary conflicts, information (in 
the richest sense of the term) is what wins 
wars (Gray 1997, 2005).
Hearts and minds are not won by 
remote targeted killing. Yet that is what US 
strategy (not just tactics) has been reduced 
to in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Iraq, and 
in Somalia. Cultural understanding has been 
reduced to masses of data on the Human 
Terrain. Social media is deployed for recruit-
ment and propaganda, but with the excep-
tion of a few “sock puppets,”2 the only 
innovative roles are for massive (sometimes 
even crowdsourced) surveillance and for the 
perfection of drones as a killing system.
Cyberspace has been the newest 
battlespace (Morello 2007) since the early 
1990s, when the Zapatistas used the 
young Internet to mobilize civil society in 
order to keep the Mexican government 
from exterminating them. But it is hard to 
fit this battlespace into traditional military 
forms. Where it overlaps with older tactical 
and strategic areas (intelligence, sabotage, 
propaganda, logistics, weapons systems), 
information technology has been deployed 
efficiently, but in the sense that cyberspace 
changes war itself, the established mili-
taries cannot adapt. They can craft con-
cepts such as “information war,” “cyber 
war,” and “net war,” but they cannot win 
these struggles. As Elaine Scarry (1987) 
proves in her masterful The Body in Pain, 
war is about changing human perceptions 
of reality through violence. The incredible 
power of new military technologies ended 
the possibility of total war, and decisive 
battle is impossible, as well, because social 
media is outpacing the ability of violence 
to change human perceptions of reality. It 
isn’t just that war is an extension of politics, 
or even that, today, to paraphrase Michel 
Foucault’s bon mot, politics often seems 
an extension of war, as in the Cold War and 
its little brother, the Terror War (Gray 1997, 
2005); rather, it has become clear that 
“technology is politics by other means” 
because “social life is technologically medi-
ated constantly and without interruption” 
(Sádaba and Gordo 2008: 10).
Violence is still powerful, of course. It 
can terrorize some people into agreement 
or silence, it can destroy people and render 
their perceptions of reality into nothingness, 
and it can enforce rules, even laws, that 
shape technologies (even social media) 
to the interests of the rich, the powerful, 
and the guilty. But this is negative power. 
The power to create new possibilities is 
something else. To explain why waves of 
protests, socially mediated by technology, 
are sweeping the world, while the most 
powerful armies grow weaker, requires a 
close analysis of contemporary social move-
ments and militaries, as well as the codes 
and protocols of sociotechnical systems, 
including the latest social media: drones.
Technosocial Mediation
Protocol is how control exists after distribution 
achieves hegemony as a formal diagram. It is 
etiquette for autonomous agents. It is the chivalry 
of the object.
 — Alexander Galloway, Protocol 
The main function of computers is social. 
Even when they focus on big data, they 
do so in the service of selling to, mon-
itoring, serving, killing, or in some way 
communicating with, and for, humans. But 
as computers have become ubiquitous, 
converging into one thick interweb, we 
have come to call the nodes and inter-
faces that are dedicated to one- to- one 
and one- to- many sociality social media, in 
contrast to the institutionalized broadcasts 
(to the many) of mass media. Mass media 
is often defined as “push” media, in that 
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it is pushed at us, while social media is 
accessed when we “pull” it by choice, 
with the option (because of interconnectiv-
ity) of contributing ourselves. As Manuel 
Castells (2009) has argued, this has pro-
duced a transformation of sociability itself.
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other 
platforms have joined e- mails, blogs, and 
web pages as modes for the proliferation 
of social connectivity. As Esther Dyson 
(2012) points out, social media “changes 
the balance of power between individuals 
and institutions.” Contemporary social 
movements don’t just use social media; it 
is a crucial part of their milieu, their con-
text. In some cases, the movements only 
exist through social media (e.g., Anony-
mous, WikiLeaks).
Because the first digital social media 
to fundamentally change society have 
been virtual, we forget that much human 
sociality is physical. To extend that phys-
icality through technology is still social. 
Since drones, teleoperated or remotely 
piloted vehicles, are extensions of the user 
physically, they, too, are social media. Lev 
Grossman explains: “A drone isn’t just 
a tool; when you use it you see and act 
through it — you inhabit it. It expands the 
reach of your body and senses in much the 
same way the internet expands your mind. 
The net extends our virtual presence; 
drones extend our physical presence . . . 
one of a handful of genuinely transforma-
tive technologies to emerge in the last 10 
years” (2013: 28). Drone technology isn’t 
just a tool, a machine with a program. 
Similar to other social media, it consti-
tutes a relationship between humans and 
machines. But while Facebook and the like 
are natural- to- use extensions of our friend-
ships and working relationships, drones 
are disturbing. Grossman notes: “There is 
something uncanny about drones. . . . It’s 
roughly analogous to interacting with an 
anonymous contributor on a blog. You’re 
dealing with someone who is both present 
and absent, who has decided that what 
they say or do will have consequences for 
you but not for them. Drones bring that 
asymmetrical dynamic out into the real 
world: a drone is the physical avatar of the 
virtual presence of a real person” (2013: 
31). As drones proliferate in type and 
influence throughout culture, in the same 
way that social media has, we’ll need to 
differentiate their extension of physicality 
from the projection of personality that is 
“traditional” social media.
Both drone and interweb technology 
have military origins. But as the Internet 
was distributed, it grew out- of- control, so 
the Pentagon handed it off to the National 
Science Foundation, which couldn’t 
control it, either. Meanwhile, the military 
had to create their own MILNET (Military 
Network). Drones have stayed closer to 
their military origins. The Royal Air Force 
perfected target drones after World War 
I when a radio- controlled flight system, 
out of a Fairey scout 111 manned aircraft 
(“Queen”), was put into a De Havilland 
Gipsy Moth. Later, an improved target 
aircraft was called “Queen Bee.” At this 
point, the term drone was first used 
(Jarnot 2012: 6). Clearly, the reference 
was, in part, to drone bees, but with an 
added implication of impotence, as drones 
can’t sting and targets can’t shoot back.
But drones can kill now. This has 
led to an extensive academic, and even 
popular, debate around the ethics of 
“killer robots,” but, obviously, drones 
are not robots, just extraordinary human 
extensions. Extraordinary but ineffective. 
Drones are the latest military information 
technology breakthrough that fails to 
deliver strategic success. This is the pat-
tern of postmodern war.
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Drones and the Human Terrain
By design, protocols such as the Internet Protocol 
cannot be centralized.
 — Alexander Galloway, Protocol 
The central contradiction of postmodern 
war is that the most powerful weapons 
cannot be used. This contradiction pro-
duced the strange “conflicted” world of 
the Cold War and its successor, the Terror 
War. The first great military product of the 
computer age was the hydrogen bomb. 
Then came the “electronic battlefield” 
of Vietnam, which ended in a US defeat 
despite the computerization of everything 
from targeting to body counts (Gray 1997). 
The Soviet military lost in Afghanistan even 
as it embraced the same principles as the 
US military, which repeated the story there 
and in Iraq (Gray 2005).
Yet, while the approach failed and 
is losing the Pakistan war before it even 
starts, information technoscience has been 
taken to new levels with the rise of the 
drones (now used more than “manned” 
aircraft) and the quest for “total battlefield 
awareness,” as in the Human Terrain 
program. Military drones have become a 
central part of the current hybrid (digital 
and embodied) battlespace, even though 
their military efficacy is suspect. They also 
raise significant political and ethical issues, 
as exemplified by President Obama’s claim 
that they can be used to execute US citi-
zens. Military exploitation of social media 
seems equally problematic.
There are the sock puppet programs, 
part of the unironically named Operation 
Earnest Voice (OEV). The US military has 
bought “false online personalities” for fifty 
operators (“online persona management”). 
General James Mattis told the US Senate 
that OEV “supports all activities associ-
ated with degrading the enemy narrative, 
including web engagement and web- based 
product distribution capabilities.” Jeff 
Jarvis, who broke the story, says “Wash-
ington shows the morals of a clumsy 
spammer” (Jarvis 2011).
Defense giant Raytheon used what 
it has called “extreme- scale analytics” to 
create RIOT (Rapid Information Overlay 
Technology), which mines social media to 
predict behavior. A great tool for mar-
keters, it also was used in 2010, according 
to Ryan Gallaher, “to help build a national 
security system capable of analyzing 
‘trillions of entities’ from cyberspace,” not 
just for searching, but also “as a means 
of monitoring and control.” It allows for 
constructing a digital doppelgänger of 
someone, including social, economic, 
and political information, as well as a map 
of their key locations (Gallaher 2013). 
These technologies mobilize information 
and algorithms for control from above, 
much like the Human Terrain program 
does — although the latter collects infor-
mation through anthropologists, since the 
Afghans and Iraqis aren’t so established in 
social media. But, while these programs 
mine distributed networks for data, the use 
of the data is centralized.
Why this inability to fully mobilize in 
distributed networks? Because military cul-
ture is committed to hierarchy. Decentral-
ized networks can work in military culture, 
as al Qaeda (the Base) has demonstrated. 
But truly distributing power (to judge and 
originate ideas) cannot coexist with military 
chains of command. The controversy sur-
rounding Bradley Manning is a fine exam-
ple. Manning disobeyed orders and sent  
massive amounts of information to Wiki-
Leaks, the antithesis of MILNET, from  
which Manning mined the information. 
That information was collected through 
observing from above — surveillance — 
but was transformed by the alchemy of 
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WikiLeaks to observation from below — 
sousveillance. As Steve Mann (2013) has 
shown, in coining the term sousveillance, 
and by revealing the importance of our 
technologically proliferating gazes, “veil-
lance” is now a fundamental aspect of con-
temporary culture. Sousveillance threatens 
informational monopolies.
After the Vietnam War syndrome was 
recognized, the US military began to make 
the case that the domestic information 
economy was the most important “front” 
of all (Gray 1997). As a result, the US 
government has felt compelled to pursue 
social engineering of an authoritarian kind, 
as in President Obama’s “unprecedented 
war” on whistleblowers (Van Buren 2012). 
At the beginning of 2013, the Pentagon 
announced it was expanding its Cyber 
Command fivefold, adding four thousand 
people (Greenwald 2013). This initiative fits 
well with the recent expansion of social- 
media monitoring (and other big- data 
collecting and analyzing) by the National 
Security Agency (NSA). The NSA (led by 
General Keith Alexander, who also heads 
Cyber Command) not only built a domestic 
network of regional centers and domes-
tic listening posts but is also building the 
world’s most powerful spy center in Utah 
(Bamford 2012). In a Washington Post 
editorial advocating this expansion, Vice 
Admiral Mike McConnell (former Direc-
tor of National Intelligence) argued that 
the United States needs “to develop an 
early- warning system to monitor cyber-
space, identify intrusions and locate the 
source of attacks with a trail of evidence 
that can support diplomatic, military and 
legal options — and we must be able to 
do this in milliseconds. More specifically, 
we need to reengineer the Internet to 
make attribution, geolocation, intelligence 
analysis and impact assessment — who 
did it, from where, why and what was the 
result — more manageable” (McConnell 
2010). Of course, easier said than done. 
Many active users have a different vision 
than Admiral McConnell has, not just for 
the interweb but for society.
Socially Mediated Movements
It is through protocol that one must guide one’s 
efforts, not against it.
 — Alexander Galloway, Protocol 
Founded through Facebook by four women 
in Canada, Idle No More became a world-
wide movement in two months (Bernd 
2013). It “has been driven by social media, 
a place where anyone can participate in 
discussion and follow news if they have 
an Internet connection or smartphone” 
(Donkin 2013). Idle No More is only the 
latest movement to use digital technology 
integrally. In many ways, labels such as 
Arab Spring, Occupy, Los Indignados, and 
Idle No More don’t mark new movements 
so much as current incarnations of ongoing 
resistance cultures that social media is 
revitalizing in new and more potent ways.
The spark that started the Arab Spring 
was the protest suicide of Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor the 
police forced out of business for insuffi-
cient bribery. His sacrifice sparked a con-
flagration. Social media played an impor-
tant role in shaping the understandings 
(the fuel) of the Tunisian revolutionaries, 
and it was even more important as revo-
lution spread to Egypt (catalyzed by the 
police murder of a blogger) and beyond.
Early on, Anonymous launched Oper-
ation Tunisia. It included denial- of- service 
attacks on government websites and a 
care packet, in Arabic and French, on iden-
tity concealment for cyber dissidents. A 
Greasemonkey script was written to “help 
Tunisians evade an extensive phishing 
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campaign carried out by the government” 
(Ryan 2011). Anonymous was not alone. 
Among the important cybergroups catalyz-
ing the Arab Spring are Avaaz, Telecomix, 
Witness, Herdict, OpenNet Initiative, and 
the Open Mesh Project.
The ongoing Egyptian revolution 
is a good model for the role of social 
media in extreme social change. While 
it came together, in part, through Face-
book and other social technologies, it 
only succeeded because of its strength 
in the streets and its sophistication about 
technology. For example, while eighty- five 
thousand people signed up on Facebook 
for the January 25 protests that began the 
revolution, the actual organizing for that 
day was by word of mouth, because the 
protesters had learned that the Egyptian 
military had purchased, from the Ger-
man military, a full “cracking” package 
that allowed total access to e- mails, web 
pages, Facebook accounts, and Twitter 
feeds (Salah 2011). So, in the days leading 
up to January 25, false information was 
planted across the interweb.
By the time the revolutionaries had 
seized Tahrir (Cairo’s heart) and the Egyp-
tian government blocked Egypt’s telecom-
munications, it was too late. The shutdown 
only provoked people to go out in the 
streets to see their friends and to find out 
what was going on. Just as important, Al 
Jazeera TV, which could not be cut off, 
was showing such atrocities as the Battle 
of the Camels.
Los Indignados in Spain began crystal-
izing in February 2011 when the group No 
les Votes formed online to urge abstention 
on a law to tax culture and defend corporate 
copyrights. The national initiative Revolución 
Ciudadana Espontánea also began then. Its 
principles included peaceful street protests, 
rejecting the two- party system through 
participatory democracy, governance by 
assembly, and unity around human rights 
and a decent life (“una protesta de tod@s 
por todo”). The very similar Estado del 
Malestar also started in February.
This wave of new collectives, groups, 
movements, metamovements, and other 
initiatives took place both physically and 
virtually. The most important was the 
Plataforma de Coordinación de Grupos 
Pro- Movilización Ciudadana, which brought 
together Anonymous, ADESORG (Asoci-
ación Nacional de Desempleados), Ponte 
en Pie, Juventud en Acción, and others to 
organize a demonstration in Madrid against 
voting for the Socialist party. Then it called 
for major demonstrations across Spain for 
May 15, under the slogan “¡Democracia 
Real Ya!”
Social media is integral to this orga-
nizing. Coordinating collectives emerged 
in different cities linked mainly through 
Facebook. At the grassroots, institutions 
such as Medialabs (temporarily autono-
mous spaces) and Autonomous Social 
Centres (from the autonomous and 
squatting movements), like Tabacalera, 
Patio Maravillas, and Casablanca in Madrid 
and Kukutza in País Vasco, played a major 
role. Besides the N- 1 social network, the 
main technodimension of the movement is 
the 15hack platform, an open- code space 
(Moreno- Caballud 2013).
A full mapping of these new political- 
technical developments is impossible 
because, in a sort of Heisenberg Uncer-
tainty Principle of political change, noticing 
and using them promulgates more of 
them. Connections between the techni-
cal and the political are clear at a deeper 
level, in shared ideas of the commons 
(Benkler 2006; Holmes 2007; Estalella, 
Rocha, and Lafuente 2013), open- source 
distributed network processes, rhizomes, 
DIY/DIT (do- it- yourself/do- it- together) 
citizenship (Boler 2008), augmediated 
Chris Hables Gray and Ángel Gordo
C
u
lt
u
r
a
l 
P
O
l
It
Ic
s 
•
 1
0:
3 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4
2
5
8
participation (Bauwens 2012), maktivism 
(Mann 2014), and veillance (Mann 2013). In 
many respects, it comes down to nonhi-
erarchical governance (Internet protocols, 
crowdsourcing, the mass meetings of 
the Arab Spring, Los Indignados, and 
Occupy) and in shared groups and techs 
(Anonymous, WikiLeaks, Ushahidi, and 
Open Mesh, among many others). As Paul 
Mason notes: “Once information networks 
become social, the implications are mas-
sive: truth can now travel faster than lies, 
and all propaganda becomes instantly flam-
mable. . . . Whereas the basic form of, say, 
a Leninist party, a guerrilla army or even a 
ghetto riot has not changed in a century, 
once you use social networks the organi-
zational format of revolt goes into con-
stant flux” (Mason 2012). The form is not 
separate from the process or the results. 
Certain networks lend themselves to some 
processes better than others. Why this is 
turns out to be very important.
Affordances, Protocols, and Control
Protocol is a circuit, not a sentence.
 — Alexander Galloway, Protocol
The concept of affordances used in dis-
cussions of human- computer interaction 
derives from the fields of both psychology 
and design. While there are nuances to 
both perspectives, as well as others (Soe-
gaard 2010), we use affordances here in 
the sense that objects (including complex 
networks that are hybrids of the virtual 
and the physical) ontologically are easier to 
use in some ways than others by specific 
users (individuals, groups, or subcultures) 
because of the options they “afford.”
Different affordances in information 
technologies (in architecture, code, and 
protocols) match with different technocul-
tures because of their epistemologies. Is 
knowledge the result of tradition, elites, 
and formalisms? Or is it the result of 
innovation, collectivity, and dynamic pro-
cesses? How one answers this question 
has clear political implications as well. 
Contemporary horizontalist social move-
ments incorporate new social technologies 
into their praxis, in order to change society, 
while militaries seek to conserve the cur-
rent system.
Human culture has structures. Infor-
mation, energy, and matter flow through 
human society along established lines. 
But it is messy. Marriage and property and 
power rules and rituals are sustained only 
through human acceptance. Information 
flows through formal computer networks, 
as well, but even though they grow, and 
grow together, and change continually, 
they are sustained by more than belief. 
They are instantiated in machines and code 
and organized by protocols.
MILNET is formal and hierarchical. 
This is true of most intranets (internal net-
works), although some are decentralized. 
A decentralized network does not have 
one hierarchy; it has multiple trees or other 
forms linked together in a metahierarchy. A 
distributed network has no top, no center. 
It may contain smaller hierarchical nodes, 
but its overall form is of a mesh. This is the 
worldwide interweb. Facilitated by open 
committees of experts who set the inter-
communication standards, the interweb 
has evoked a widely shared ethos, articu-
lated in the 1997 “One Planet, One Net” 
manifesto of Computer Professionals for 
Social Responsibility (CPSR). It declared 
that “there is only one net” that should be 
available to all, and we are its stewards, 
not owners. No “individuals, organizations, 
or governments should dominate,” and 
it “should reflect human diversity, not 
homogenize it” (CPSR 1997). People have 
a right to communicate and to privacy.
These values don’t come from 
hardware or software. They are political 
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principles. In 1973, Colin Ward published 
Anarchy in Action, where he argued that 
liberation emerged from principles such 
as “spontaneous order” and “harmony 
through complexity” (Ward 1973). The 
next year, Ted Nelson’s Computer Lib/
Dream Machines came out, claiming that 
computers could foster similar principles in 
society. Since then, there has been a prolif-
eration of principles, processes, and even 
products that link antiauthoritarian social 
movements and cutting- edge computing.
Kevin Kelly (1995) echoes Ward when 
explaining how systems out of external 
control (weather, economies) regulate 
themselves. They are distributed with 
autonomous subunits and high connectiv-
ity. But distributed systems are not auto-
matically democratic.In Code, Lawrence 
Lessig (1999) points out that the Internet 
is not immune to corruption and even to 
appropriations that would change it from 
an open to a closed system. Lessig argues 
that a state is necessary to keep the web 
free through “self- conscious control.”3 But 
collective consciousness doesn’t require 
states, just community. It can be built 
into the code, in terms of the law Lessig 
prioritizes and, more importantly, in the 
protocols (technical rules and standards) 
of the systems, as Alexander Galloway 
(2004) contends. The basic processes 
of self- control in systems (feedback, 
self- reference, homeostasis, checks and 
balances, distributed power) are the most 
scalable, the most prolific, and the best 
creators of new emergent properties.
Insightful as Galloway is, he errs by 
misunderstanding control. His claim that 
“the Internet is the most highly controlled 
mass media hitherto known” (2004: 243) 
is true enough, but only because the con-
trol is homeostatic; it is self- governance. 
Lessig’s view includes “content” as a 
major factor in a network, while Galloway 
proudly “makes no allowances for special 
anthropomorphic uses of data” (Galloway 
2004: 40). This is a major gap in under-
standing the potential of hybrid distributed 
systems, for humans decide how they are 
used. This can be done consciously (open- 
source) with the creation of protocols that 
serve specific values.
Although, to be fair, as governance, 
this process is unusual for humans (but 
not for bees). It isn’t “self” control, but 
collective control, in the truest sense, 
which means that often individuals don’t 
get their way. Such distributed systems 
won’t necessarily make the best decisions, 
but they might. Group decisions are usually 
better than hierarchical choices, and they 
are indeed “dangerous” to the powers that 
be (Galloway 2004: 16).
Our anthrocentric choices about data 
use are crucial, after all. But those choices 
are not the only ones. The most important 
choice is of epistemology: open or closed? 
Closed epistemologies don’t mesh well 
with open systems; closed systems pro-
voke responses from open epistemologies. 
The spread of surveillance produced a 
wave of sousveillance that, far from abat-
ing, is becoming ubiquitous (Mann 2013). 
The same dynamic will shape extension 
(drone) technoscience. The Federal Avia-
tion Administration predicts that by 2020 
there will be thirty thousand civilian drones 
in the United States (Uberti 2012). It is 
quite possible that there will be ten times 
that number. Extensions from “above” will 
be met with those from below, leading 
to a society that is saturated by extended 
physicality, as we now live immersed in 
veillance and social media.
The traffic goes both ways. As 
networks are used, they evolve in partic-
ular directions. Thomas Hughes (1983) 
shows how large sociotechnical networks 
(think power grids) reach a tipping point of 
technological momentum where one form 
becomes hegemonic over the others. This 
Chris Hables Gray and Ángel Gordo
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isn’t necessarily a worldwide phenome-
non. Hughes looked at Soviet and North 
American power grids that did develop 
different protocols. But, in the case of 
the interweb, it will be fundamentally one 
form: one net for one planet.
Notes
1.  The term interweb refers to the convergence of 
the Internet, the web, and mobile social media.
2.  The term sock puppets refers to invented online 
fake personas used for false- flag recruitments or 
for spreading propaganda and disinformation.
3.  Lawrence Lessig put Code online for 
crowdsourced editing. The result, Code: 2.0, is 
more balanced.
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